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Abstract:  The reliability and scalability of large-scale based optical fiber sensor networks 
(AOFSN) are considered in this paper. The AOFSN network consists of three-level hierarchical 
sensor network architectures. The first two levels consist of active interrogation and remote 
nodes (RNs) and the third level, called the sensor subnet (SSN), consists of passive Fiber Bragg 
Gratings (FBGs) and a few switches. The switch architectures in the RN and various SSNs to 
improve the reliability and scalability of AOFSN are studied. Two SSNs with a regular topology 
are proposed to support simple routing and scalability in AOFSN: square-based sensor cells 
(SSC) and pentagon-based sensor cells (PSC). The reliability and scalability are evaluated in 
terms of the available sensing coverage in the case of one or multiple link failures. 
Keywords: AOFSN; FBG; hierarchical; reliability scalability 
 
1. Introduction 
Optic fiber sensor networks, which are multiplexed with arrays of optical fiber sensors, have 
received increasing attention due to their attractive advantages. They are immune to electromagnetic 
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interference, harsh or hostile environments, and therefore can be deployed in areas where 
electrical-based sensors would fail or require expensive protection. A number of similar or different 
sensors can be attached along a single optical fiber, and remote data over kilometers can be processed 
without corruption. Among the optical fiber sensors, Fiber Bragg Grating (FBG) sensor has been the 
most attractive type due to its smart architecture, large-scale multiplexing capability, immunity to 
electromagnetic interference, and because it is power-free. A popular technique for multiplexing FBG 
sensors is wavelength division multiplexing (WDM). The number of accommodated FBG sensors is 
determined by the usable spectral bandwidth of the system and the wavelength-shift of each FBG 
sensor. FBGs have been studied extensively in terms of strain and temperature measurements. Because 
of the wavelength-encoded nature of FBGs, they can be wavelength-division multiplexed to form an 
array or network for multi-point or quasi-distributed measurements. A popular scheme to realize a 
WDM FBG sensor network involves using a tunable optical filter (TOF) and detecting the peak 
wavelengths when the TOF is scanned through the FBG spectrums in [1-4]. 
The applications of FBG based AOFSN are diverse, such as in environment monitoring, home 
caring, etc. Another application, called structural monitoring, is becoming very important as ever more 
high buildings, large mansions and huge bridges are built. Structural monitoring for such as tunneling, 
building and bridge health are very important, because their damage or collapse will cause serious 
accidents. In order to monitor their security status, large-scale sensor networks are necessary and the 
FBG based AOFSN becomes an appropriate candidate. Regular arrays of FBG sensors multiplexed 
into fibers are distributed inside them to construct large-scale AOFSN and monitor their construct 
security. Such kind of large-scale AOFSNs require high reliability to guarantee the monitoring accuracy. 
Many researches that consider the reliability or construction of sensor networks based on FBG have 
been studied. A novel fiber-laser-based sensor network with a self-healing function is proposed in [1]. 
It is based on adding switches to self-healing ring architectures. Some novel designs of wavelength 
multiplexed fiber sensor networks that are tolerant to one or more cable failures are proposed in [2]. 
They used protection switching to recover service. In [5], the authors introduce a low cost array which 
has a low susceptibility to failure when damage is induced for smart structures using FBGs as sensing 
elements. In [3], a star-bus-ring architecture for FBG sensors was proposed. The FBG survivability and 
capacity of a multipoint sensor system are enhanced by adding remote nodes and 2 × 2 optical 
switches. Research [4] proposed a new sensor-network model that considers the survivability and 
expansibility. However, complex switches were used to ensure reliability, which increases the cost   
and SNR. 
Based on the above achievements, we provide a further detailed insight into the construction of a 
large-scale AOFSN network using FBGs. The proposed AOFSN is composed of three levels and can 
be classified into two active levels consisting of the first interrogation level and the second RN level, 
and a passive level consisting of FBGs. The reliability of the AOFSN network is improved by 
achieving reliability in the second and third levels. As the second level consisting of RNs is active, 
reliability is realized by proposing switching architectures for RN nodes. This enables the optical 
signals to be switched through different routing paths in order to recover FBGs distributed besides 
failed links. The FBG based AOFSN can construct power-efficient sensor network, as the passive FBG 
requires little power to control, but requires complex and expensive interrogator systems to collect and 
analyze the sensing signals. Therefore, simple but efficient routing schemes are necessary to reduce the Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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use of interrogations and to alleviate the burden of the limited and expensive interrogations. As the 
proposed AOFSN network is mainly constructed by wired and passive FBG sensors, the routing 
scheme aims at constructing unicursal and regular virtual topologies. The unicursal concept enables us 
to scan all or near to all FBG sensors by emitting light once. The regular concept enables the 
interrogations to control and process the sensing signals easily. The polygon cell based AFOSN is 
considered to be an appropriate candidate, as they remain unicursal and regular after being extended. 
More specifically, the square and pentagon based AOFSN will be discussed in our research as 
examples of polygon-based topologies for AOFSN. 
In this paper, we first review the proposed different kinds of hierarchical AOFSN networks in our 
previous research in [6]. The two regular types of sensor cells (SC) called the square-based SC (SSC) 
and the pentagon-based SC (PSC), and how to improve the reliability and scalability through the third 
passive SSN level are all reviewed firstly. Then, the reliability and scalability are numerically 
considered in this paper. The reliability is evaluated in terms of how many link failures the proposed 
AOFSN can tolerate. The scalability is evaluated in terms of whether a scaled sensor network can 
maintain a self-similar virtual structure with its lower level structure, so as to maintain a similar sensor 
routing scheme. More exactly in this paper, the reliability is calculated and evaluated by considering 
the coverage sensing area when one or multiple link failures happen, and the scalability is calculated 
and evaluated by considering the number of required FBGs, the cost of the required number of 2 × 2 
switches and the corresponding coverage. 
2. Hierarchical AOFSN Architectures 
As mentioned above, the proposed AOFSN comprises three levels: the first is the 
interrogation/sever (InS). It manages the second and third levels to check for link failure between RNs 
and InS or sensor cells, by sending and collecting scanning signals from RNs; the second level is the 
interface/RNs (Remote Nodes). Several RNs comprise the self-healing ring architecture. Each RN 
manages its own sensor subnet to collect scanning signals from the third level and then they provide 
feedback to the first InS level. The third level is the sensor subnet. It consists of some passive FBG 
sensors, executing the scanning request and providing feedback to their upper RN level. 
The cost of hardware in AOFSN is mainly due to the interrogation and switches and the 
interrogation is the most expensive device. In order to reduce the cost of the most expensive 
interrogation device and utilize it efficiently and sensibly, three different types of hierarchical AOFSNs 
are proposed. They mainly differ in terms of whether the second communication network level and the 
first interrogation level are grouped. By grouping them, the cost due to interrogation and the burden of 
interrogation for demodulating large numbers of signals can be reduced in order to utilize resources 
efficiently. The architectures are discussed in detail and shown in Figure 1.   
The first type is shown in Figure 1. The first level is composed of one interrogation/server for signal 
recognition. The second level is the interface level between the interrogation/server and sensor subnets. 
It is composed of a self-healing unidirectional ring consisting of N RNs. Each RN manages its own 
sensor subnet. All RNs are centrally controlled by the only interrogation and are responsible for 
collecting data and providing feedback to it. Thus, the RNs can simultaneously receive the scanning 
requests from a common interrogation, and they execute the scanning process to provide feedback of 
the scanning results to the interrogation. Finally, the interrogation selects the signals useful for Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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recognition and decides the sensing results from all the feedback signals by the below RNs. The 
second type is shown in Figure 1(b). Of all the sensing signals collected by the RNs in the second level, 
the useful ones can be quite rare. Many researches on wireless networks apply a three-point location 
mechanism. Only three sensor nodes are activated for sensing and they provide useful sensing signals 
each time. In the AOFSN, we apply a similar candidate mechanism in the second level in order to 
reduce the burden of the only interrogation. That is, the RNs in the second level are grouped according 
to their geographical positions instead of providing all the raw sensing signals to the only 
interrogations directly. Each time the interrogation sends the scanning request to its below RNs, it 
estimates the approximate geographical scanning region from the results of the last scanning process. 
Then it first selects one or several specific groups to do the scanning process and collects the feedback 
signals from these specific groups. Thus, the burden of the interrogation is further reduced and the 
scanning speed is improved. This screen-out mechanism can be realized by selecting nearby regions 
with higher strength signals according to the last scanning results. The third type is shown in Figure 1(c). 
It is an alternative from the second type. The interrogation level is further grouped according to the 
interrogating techniques. This architecture is applicable for heterogeneous sensor networks, as each 
interrogation can interrogate different types of feedback scanning signals. This type has high flexibility 
compared to the first two types but there is a higher cost, because more interrogations are used. The 
three types of hierarchical architecture were proposed based on the cost or burden of the first two 
levels. The construction of the SSN will be discussed in the next section.   
Figure 1. (a) No grouping in the first two levels; (b) Grouping in the second level; (c) 
Grouping in the first and second levels. 
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3. Sensor Subnet Construction 
FBG has been one of the most promising sensor technologies and has been dynamically developed 
during past decades. FBG is known for its passive characteristic, i.e., FBG sensors are passive devices 
and the transmit carrier involves passive sensing signals. The signals are sent and reflected passively 
without any active actions of their own. The sensing action is processed via InS (or RNs) in the higher 
levels, by comparing their reflected wave or other parameters with their original ones. Therefore, for 
such a wired and passive sensing system, consideration of a unicursal- and regular- connected network 
topology is necessary. The unicursal concept is suggested in order to guarantee that all the FBG Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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sensors can be scanned at once. This enables us to multiplex as many FBGs as possible in one fiber in 
order to reduce the cost. However, to increase the reliability of the AOFSN, several 2 × 2 switches are 
needed to do the recovery process when link failure happens. The regular concept is suggested in order 
to provide a simple routing scheme and improve the scalability. A regular topology is always easy to 
route and can be scaled to larger ones while maintaining a self-similar virtual regular topology and a 
self-similar routing scheme. Based on the above considerations, this section proposes two main basic 
virtual topologies based on the square-based SC (SSC) and pentagon-based SC (PSC), respectively. As 
we previously mentioned, the third level is further divided into three levels, denoted by the Sensor Cell 
(SC), Sensor Subnet Group (SSG) and Sensor Sub Network (SSN).   
3.1. Two Unicursal and Regular SC-Based AFOSN 
3.1.1. Square SC (SSC)-Based AFOSN 
Firstly, we apply a square model as a sensor cell to construct the sensor subnets. As shown in Figure 2(a), 
four FBGs (denoted 1-4) are distributed on each side of the square and one 2 × 2 switch is set at the 
joint point of FBG 1 and FBG 4 in order to guarantee the reliability of its SSC. It should be mentioned 
that more FBGs can be set on each side of an SSC, which can also be seen as a virtual ring topology. 
For simplicity, we discuss the SSC topology which has only one FBG set on each side as shown in 
Figure 2(a). 
The 2 × 2 switch is very important for the SSC in view of survivability if any link failures happen, 
as described in [3,6]. Light can be sent in and out of any of the four ports. The scanning direction is 
clockwise in the normal case and counterclockwise in case of link failure. The SSC can be easily 
scaled to a larger SSC group (SSCG) by connecting four SSCs and the SSCG will still maintain a 
square-like virtual topology, as shown in Figure 2(b). One more FBG is set on the link that connects 
two SSCs. Therefore, 20 FBGs are embedded after the first scaling. In other words, each SSCG 
consists of four SSCs and one CSC (central SC). The SSCG can be further scaled to a larger group, 
which consists of four SSCGs and one CSC. The detail is discussed in the following section. A sensor 
subnet is composed of one or several SSCGs, and we give an example of an AOFSN with an SSN 
consisting of four SSCGs, as shown in Figure 2(c).   
Figure 2. (a) SSC; (b) SSC group; (c) SSN. 
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As mentioned in Section 2, there is one interrogation and four RNs, and the interrogation is 
connected to all four RNS in order to enable light to be sent to them for scanning. The four RNs are 
constructed in a ring manner, thus each is also responsible for recovery when failure happens between 
their upstream RN and the interrogation. In the normal case, the optical signals are sent from the 
interrogation to the four RNs; and then, each RN sends the signal to its responsible SSCG in the 
clockwise direction, in order to collect the feedback signals from all the FBGs. After collecting the 
feedback signals, the RNs analyze if there is any change of the sensing signals. If so, the RN nodes 
provide the feedback of this change to the interrogation; otherwise, they don’t provide any feedback 
signal in order to save the energy of the interrogation. 
3.1.2. Pentagon SC (PSC)-Based AFOSN 
This section considers a pentagon-based sensor cell to construct each sensor subnet. Similar to a 
SSC, five FBGs (denoted 1-5), are distributed on each side of the PSC as shown in Figure 3(a). 
Similarly, one 2 × 2 switch is set at the joint point of FBG 1 and FBG 5 in order to guarantee the 
reliability of each PSC. Light can be sent in and out of any of these four ports. In the normal case, the 
scanning direction is clockwise, and vice versa. PSCs can also be easily scaled to a larger PSC group 
(PSCG) by connecting five PSCs, as shown in Figure 3(b). Two PSCs share a switch and the PSCG 
also maintains a pentagon-like virtual topology for further scaling. A sensor subnet is composed of one 
or several PSCGs, which is similar to that of the SSCG. The difference with the SSC is that no more 
connected links are needed when PSCs are scaled to larger PSCGs. The reliability of the higher two 
levels is discussed and realized mainly by resetting the switch in the RN. Thus, the switch architectures 
are designed first and then the reliability of the SSN level is discussed. 
Figure 3. (a) PSC; (b) PSC group (PSCG). 
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4. Consideration of Reliability 
4.1. Switch Architecture for Higher-Level Reliability 
There are two kinds of link failures of the first two levels: the failure between the interrogation and 
RN, and the failure between RNs. Considering Figure 2(c) for example, only one link failure between 
two RNs does not affect the scanning process for each SSN. However, if a link failure occurs between 
the interrogation/server (InS) and RN, the RN cannot receive the emitted scanning light from the InS 
and the whole SSN under the charge of it cannot be scanned and detected. To solve this problem, RNs 
are connected in a unidirectional ring manner in order to perform self-healing in case of a link failure Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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between itself and InS, as shown in Figure 2(c). In that case, the RN receives scanning signals from its 
upstream RN nodes instead, so as to guarantee good reliability. Therefore, the switch architecture 
within the RN nodes is crucial for the recovery process and is shown in Figure 4(a).   
Four couplers are needed, two for discriminating the control signal from the scanning signals (SSs); 
the other two couplers, named Cn (1    2) and Cf (1    3), are used for recovery when a link failure 
happens. In the normal case, considering Figure 5 for example, the RN receives light from the 
interrogation and then emits light from FBG 1-1 to the other FBGS in a clockwise direction in order to 
collect SSs, as shown in Figure 4(b); if a link failure happens in the third level, signals are emitted 
from InS and split into two by switching to Cn (1    2) in order to scan from F1 and F4 
simultaneously, as shown in Figure 4(c). While in case of a link failure between RNi and InS, the 
switch in node RNi-1 will be reset as follows: scanning signals emitted from the InS port are switched 
to Cn (1    2) and split into two, one for its own SSN from F1 and one for the input of RNi, as shown 
in Figure 4(d). If there is a link failure between RNi-1’s downstream node and InS, and a simultaneous 
link failure within its own managed SSN, the switch is setup as shown in Figure 4(e) for node RNi-1, 
and scanning signals received from InS are switched to Cf (1    3) and split into three, two for its own 
SSN’s scanning from both sides and one for the input of RNi. In view of node RNi, it receives the 
scanning signal from the input port RNi-1 instead of InS. 
Figure 4. (a) Switch architecture of RN; (b) Normal case; (c) Failure in level 3; (d) Failure 
between level 1and 2; (e) Failure between level 1 and 2, within level 3. 
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4.2. Reliability in SSN Level 
This section discusses the reliability of the SSN level for both SSC- and PSC-based AOFSN in 
terms of their self-healing abilities. Considering the SSNs shown in Figure 2(b) and Figure 3(b), both 
are tolerant to at least one link failure. If more than one link failures happen, some of the 2 × 2 
switches should be selected for resetting according to the failure point. Figures 5(a) and (b) show the 
case of one link failure in region SSC3. In the normal case, light is emitted from the RN which is 
connected to SSC1 and then the RN sends scanning signals in a clockwise direction to the remaining Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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sensors. When one link failure happens, as shown in Figure 5(b), the switch in the RN is set to that 
shown in Figure 4(b), and the RN emits light simultaneously in both the clockwise and 
counterclockwise direction for recovery.   
Figure 5. (a) Single-link failure; (b) Self-healing for one link failure. 
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In case of two link failures as shown in Figure 6(a), two sensors in SSC3 and SSC4 cannot be 
scanned in the normal case. In order to rescan the remaining separated sensors, the 2 × 2 switches in the 
two regions SSC3 and SSC4 are reset as shown in Figure 6(b). The switch in the RN is also reset in 
Figure 4(b). The reset signal was previously transmitted through the control channel. The recovery 
process for the SSN of PSC-based AOFSN is shown in Figures 7(a)-(f). The PSC-based SSN in Figure 
3(b) can be made tolerant to up to four simultaneous link failures by resetting the 2 × 2 switches within 
each PSC. There is a separate control channel similar to that of the switch architecture of the RN. The 
control signals for switching settings were sent previously through the control channel before sending 
the scanning signals, so as to set up the switches, then the scanning signals are resent for self-recovery, 
as shown in Figure 7. Figure 7 shows the case of four link failures, which is the extreme case, i.e., even 
though the case of simultaneous four failures will rarely happen, we provide the example to describe 
the self-healing process showing the reliability of the PSC-based SSN. This kind of PSC-based SSN 
can achieve high reliability with strong self-healing capability, by using and resetting several 2 × 2 
switches. The case of two simultaneous link failures in the same region can also be tolerated for the 
PSC-based SSN. In order to recover from the link failure in time, the InS emits light to detects the link 
failure periodically. Each time when InS emits ligth to detect the link failure, it considers there is no 
link failure and sends signals to set all the switches as shown in Figure 4(b). The switching time of 
each switch is supposed to be  and the total(longest) fiber length is set to be l. Therefore, the timeout 
time for the InS to wait for the feedback signals is       

s
j
j timeout v l T
0
/ , where v is the velocity of 
light speed in fiber, s is the total number of switches, and j is the switching time of the j-th switch,  
is the extra time to guaratee that InS can receive the feedback signal. If InS receives no feedback signal 
after Ttimeout, InS will judge that all the links between InS and RNs are broken. On the other side, if all 
the signals are feedbacked after Ttimeout, InS decides there is no link failures anywhere. Otherwise, if 
any emitted signals are not feedbacked, InS can decide the positions of failure links and their 
responsible switch, and then start to recover. The recovery signals are decided by the InS, distributed to 
RNs, and executed by switches as introduced in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 6. (a) Dual-link failures; (b) Self-healing for dual-link failures. 
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Figure 7. (a) Four link failures; (b) Self-healing 1; (c) Self-healing 2; (d) Self-healing 3;  
(e) Self-healing 4; (f) Self-healing 5. 
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5. Consideration of Scalability 
This section discusses the scalability of the proposed AOFSN. Large scale sensor networks 
consisting of hundreds of thousands of sensor nodes can link the physical world to global 
communication networks for a broad set of applications. The current technology for embedding FBG 
sensors can multiplex as many as 1000 FBGs into one fiber in order to construct a large sensor array. 
Considering this advantage and the current requirement for large-scale sensor systems, it’s necessary to 
discuss the performance of our proposed SSN after scaling to a larger scale. As we have discussed, for 
the small-scale SSNs, which consist of the 20-FBG shown in Figure 5 for SSC, and the 25 FBGs 
shown in Figure 8 for PSC, we tried to scale them in order to multiplex as many as possible. After 
scaling the small-scale SSNs to a large-scale AOFSN system, the maintenance of the routing 
mechanisms for scanning sensors, in both the normal case and the case of link failure happening, is 
important for maintaining low cost and simplicity. The SSC- or PSC-based SSNs were proposed to 
realize scaling, as previously mentioned. As their topologies are regular and unicursal, they have good 
scalability in view of maintaining a self-similar virtual topology and the same recovery routing 
algorithms for the much larger scales shown in Figures 8 and 9. As we can see in Figure 8, Figure 8(a) Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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shows the basic square-based sensor cell (SSC) consisting of four FBGs and an RN node. Figure 8(b) 
is scaled from the SSC shown in Figure 8(a) and it is consisted of four SSCs and an additional central 
sensor cell (CSC). The CSC in the center of the four SSCs is added to connect the four SSCs, and its 
architecture is the same as the other SSCs. Figure 8(c) is scaled from the SSC group (SSCG) shown in 
Figure 8(b) and is consisted of four SSCGs and an additional CSC5 in the center to connect the four 
SSCGs. By scaling in the manner shown in Figures 8(b) and (c), the routing mechanism in the normal 
case and in case of link failures can be maintained, as the architectures in Figures 8(a), (b) and (c) 
remain self-similar. The differences are that more switches should be set for the high-scale 
architectures, to switch the control signals in case of link failures. 
Figure 8. (a) SSC; (b) first extension; (c) second extension. 
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Figure 9. (a) PSC; (b) first extension; (c) second extension. 
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In view of the PSC-based architectures shown in Figure 9, the process is very similar to that shown 
in Figure 8. The architecture in Figure 9(b) is scaled from that shown in Figure 9(a) and consists of 
five PSCs. Similarly, the architecture shown in Figure 9(c) is scaled from that shown in Figure 9(b) 
and consists of the five PSCGs shown in Figure 9(b). Two adjacent PSCGs are connected by one 
switch, thus improving the reliability. So, we propose the concept of scaling degree. The scaling degree 
is one based on Figures 8(a) and (b), and it is two based on Figures 8(b) and (c).   
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6. Numerical Results 
6.1. Reliability  Analysis 
The reliability of a sensor network in case of node or link failures is crucial, as it decides the 
sensing accuracy of an objective in case of failures; node or link failures do happen as time advances. 
The sensing accuracy of a sensor network is further decided by the coverage of the sensors. In other 
words, the sensing coverage characterizes the monitoring quality provided by a sensor network in a 
designated region. Distributed detection requires that every location be monitored by one or multiple 
nodes, and distributed tracking and classification requires even higher degrees of coverage. A network 
with a higher degree of coverage can maintain acceptable coverage in the face of higher rates of node 
or link failures. So the coverage of sensors in case of failures also decides the reliability of the sensor 
network. In this research, the sensing range of all the FBG sensors is assumed to be r and the length of 
the square side is supposed to be 2r. Moreover, the sensing range of each FBG sensor is supposed to be 
represented by a circle, considering the FBG as the central angle and r as the radius, as shown in 
Figure 10. 24 FBGs are used in the SSC group (SSCG) and the total coverage of the 24 sensors is 
shown by the circles in shadow. The coverage area of the 24 FBGs is calculated by formula (1).   
 


 

 
    
2
4
4 8 ) 2 ( 5
2 2
2 2 r r
r r SCovered

   (1) 
Figure 10. Coverage of SSC group (SSCG). 
 
 
In order to calculate the reliability of the proposed AOFSN architecture, the coverage area when a 
link failure happens needs to be considered. The probability of a fiber link failure is supposed to be p. 
Thus, the probability of one link failure within one SSC in Figure 8(a) is calculated by formula (2), 
where n is the number of FBGs within a SSC (four in this case). It is assumed that more than one link 
failure within one SSC cannot happen, but multiple link failures within different SSCs can happen. 
Consider Figure 8(b) for example; it consists of five SSCs, so the probability of i simultaneous link 
failures,    , is calculated by formula (3), where N is the number of SSCs (five in this case). 
  (2) 
 (3)
Then, the lost coverage after i link failures has happened is calculated for the SSC-based network. 
In section 4.1 and 4.2, reliability has been achieved by proposing the recoverable switching RN node. 
The recovery paths according to the proposed switching nodes have also been shown. However, there 
are still some FBGs that cannot be recovered if more than one link failure happens. If an FBG is not 
SSC (1 )
iN i
iN i PC PP
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recovered, it loses its sensing coverage. Consequently, the reliability of the SSC-based network is 
affected. It is calculated by formula (4), where Ai is the sensor network availability when link failure 
happens and RLost(i) is the loss rate of sensing coverage when i link failures have happened.   
  (4) 
(1). One link failure 
When one link failure happens, the FBGs separated by the failed link can be recovered by resetting 
the switches appropriately in the RNs, as shown in Figures 5(a) and (b). Thus, there will be no loss in 
the sensing coverage area and the AOFSN network can still operate as normal, as there is no link 
failure. Moreover, wherever the one link failure happens, i.e., regardless of whether it is in SSC1, 
SSC2, SSC3, SSC4 or the central sensor cell, the sensor network can recover the link failure by routing 
to the lost FBGs through different paths. In conclusion, the coverage loss ratio is zero when only one 
link failure happens, i.e., RLost(1) = 0. The availability when one link failure happens is calculated by 
formula (5) according to (4) and is 1 or 100%. 
1 ) 1 ( 1 1 1     Lost R P A   (5) 
(2). Two link failures 
When two link failures happen, most of the FBGs separated by the failed points can be recovered by 
resetting the switches in the RNs and the 2 × 2 switches that connect two sensor cells. However, not all 
FBGs can be recovered, i.e., some sensing coverage will be lost. Moreover, the lost coverage depends 
on the positions of the failed links. There are various combinations of positions of the two link failures, 
i.e., they may lie in SSC1 and SSC2, or SSC2 and SSC4, or between the central SSC5 and any other 
SSCs. Different combinations lead to different lost coverage. Thus, the reliability of two link failures 
cannot be calculated directly according to formula (4). After analyzing the lost coverage of all 
combinations, they can be divided into the two cases shown in Figures 11 and 12.   
Case 1:    
Figure 11. Unrecoverable FBGs in case 1. 
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Figure 12. Unrecoverable FBGs in case 2. 
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After recovery, only one FBG sensor node cannot be recovered in case 1, as shown in the shadow 
ellipse in Figure 11, while six FBG sensor nodes cannot be recovered in case 2, as shown in Figure 12. 
Obviously, the lost coverage area in case 2 is much higher than that of case 1. The lost ratio of the 
coverage area in case 1 is calculated as shown in Figure 13(a). Similarly, the lost ratio of the coverage 
area in case 2 is calculated as shown in Figure 13(b). The lost area and lost ratio in case 1 is calculated 
according to formulas (6) and (7). For the coverage area after recovery, the lost area and the lost ratio 
in case 2 are calculated according to formulas (8), (9) and (10) respectively. 
 
  (6) 
 (7)
2 2 2 2 2
2 27 . 28 1
2
5 2 2 3 ) 2 ( 3 r r r r r SActual  


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
         

    (8)
 (9)
  (10)
        
Figure 13. (a) Area loss in case 1; (b) Area loss in case 2.     
       
( a )                 ( b )    
Figure 14. FBG distribution in SSC5. 
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As mentioned previously, there are various combinations of positions of the two link failures. These 
are as follows: {SSC1 & SSC2, SSC1 & SSC3, SSC1 & SSC4, SSC1& SSC5, SSC2 & SSC3, SSC2 & 
SSC4, SSC2 & SSC5, SSC3 & SSC4, SSC3 & SSC5, and SSC4 & SSC5}. All 10 combinations can be 
classified into the above two cases. The important issue is how many should be classified into case 1 
and how many should be classified into case 2. They are classified according to the following rules, by 
considering SSC5 separately. Each rule is exclusive with respect to the others.   
Rule 1: If one of the two link failures lies in SSC1 which is directly connected to the RN node, the 
combination is classified into case 1. There are three combinations as follows:   
22 2
1 40 . 8 6 Lost Sr r r  
22
1(2) 0.86 /46.84 1.8% Lost Rr r 
222
2 46.84 28.27 18.57 Lost Sr r r 
22
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Case 1: {SSC1 & SSC2, SSC1 & SSC3, SSC1 & SSC4} 
Rule 2: If the two link failures lie in the two SSCs which are parallel in position besides SSC5, the 
combination is classified into case 1. There are two combinations as follows: 
Case 1: {SSC2 & SSC3, SSC3 & SSC4} 
Rule 3: If the two link failures lie in the two SSCs which are diagonal in position, the combination 
is classified into case 2. There is one combination as follows: 
Case 2: {SSC2 & SSC4} 
Rule 4: In view of the fact that one link failure lies in SSC5, the combinations cannot be directly 
classified into case 1 or case 2. If the position of another link failure is separated by two 2 × 2 switches 
from the one in SSC5, the combination should be classified into case 2, except for the cases when the 
other link failure lies in SSC1. While if the two positions are only separated by one 2 × 2 switch, the 
combination should be classified into case 2. There are 10 sub-combinations that can be classified into 
case 1, and six sub-combinations that can be classified into case 2, as follows (referring to Figure 14): 
Case 1:  
{FBG1 & SSC1, FBG1 & SSC2, FBG2 & SSC3, FBG2 & SSC4, FBG3 & SSC3, FBG 3 & SSC4, 
FBG4 & SSC1, FBG 4 & SSC4, FBG2 & SSC1, FBG3 & SSC1} 
Case 2:  
{FBG1 & SSC3, FBG1&SSC4, FBG2 & SSC4, FBG3 & SSC2, FBG4 & SSC2, FBG4 & SSC3} 
However, the sub-combinations came from the four combinations between SSC5 and the other 
SSCs (SSC5 & SSC1, SSC5 & SSC2, SSC5 & SSC3, and SSC5/4). Therefore, a total of 2.5 
combinations are classified into case 1, and 1.5 combinations are classified into case 2, according to 
rule 4. So when two link failures happen, there are three combinations according to rule 1, two 
combinations according to rule 2, and 2.5 combinations according to rule 4, which can be classified 
into case 1. So, a total of 7.5 combinations are classified into case 1, and 2.5 combinations are 
classified into case 2. Considering that the loss ratios in case 1 and case 2 are 1.8% and 39.6% 
respectively, the availability when two link failures happen, says A2, can be calculated by formula(11) 
as:   
2
2 2 1 2
2 1125 . 0 1
) 2 (# ) 1 (#
) 2 (# ) 2 ( ) 1 (# ) 2 (
1 P
ofcase ofcase
ofcase R P ofcase R P
A
Lost Lost  

    
    (11) 
(1) Three link failures 
After discussing the network reliability in case of one link failure and two link failures, the 
reliability when three link failures happen is discussed. However, only the worst case is discussed. 
When three link failures happen, the worst case of losing sensing coverage happens in the situation 
shown in Figure 15. After recovery, it is still the case that more than half of the FBG sensors cannot be 
recovered. If three link failures happen, the actual coverage is shown in Figure 15. The actual coverage, 
the lost coverage, the lost ratio and the availability when three link failures happen, denoted by     are 
calculated according to formulas (12), (13), (14), and (15), respectively. 
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Figure 15. Sensing coverage under three failures. 
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(2) Reliability calculation 
As the probability of more than three link failures happening simultaneously is quite low, this is not 
considered. This paper considers the network availabilities supposing the probabilities of one link 
failure to be 0.1%，0.05%, and 0.01% respectively. The probabilities of i (1, 2, 3) link failures within 
one or multiple SSCs are shown in Table 1. They are calculated according to formulas (2) and (3). The 
availabilities of sensing coverage in case of i link failures are calculated according to formula (4) and 
are shown in Table 2. 
Table 1. Probability of i link failures: Pi 
P 
Pi 
0.1% 0.05%  0.01% 
P1  0.019624 0.009905 0.001996
P2  0.000157 3.96E-05 1.6E-06 
P3  6.29E-07 7.93E-08 6.39E-10 
Table 2. Network Availability of i link failures: Ai 
P
Ai 
0.1% 0.05%  0.01% 
A1  1 1 1 
A2  0.99996 0.999996 1 
A3  0.999999 1 1 
6.2. Scalability Analysis 
After analyzing the reliability in case of link failures for the SSC-based SSN, this section analyzes 
the cost when scaling the sensor networks to large scales. The required numbers of FBGs and switches 
for both SSC- and PSC- based SSNs are calculated in Tables 3 and 4. As the current technology for 
embedding FBG sensors can multiplex as more as 1,000 FBGs into one fiber [7], we consider to scale 
22 2 46.84 18.35 28.49 Lost Sr r r 
2
2 28.49 (3) 60.8%
46.84
Lost r R
r
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them to multiplex as more as 1,000 or at least close to 1,000 FBGs into one fiber. Thus, the scaling 
degree of the two kinds of AOFSN is considered to three (the number of FBGs will exceed the 1,000 if 
further scaled). The calculation of the needed number of sensors and switches after scaling can be 
calculated as shown in 1) and 2), where i means the scaling degree.   
1)  Number of total sensors and switches for SSC-based AOFSN:  
 

1
1
4
i s
s
s and  


i s
s
s
1
4.  
2)  Number of total sensors and switches  for  PSC-based  AOFSN:    and 


i s
s
s
1
5.  
The formulas in 1) can be obtained from Figure 8(a) to Figure 8(c). The number of required FBGs 
and switches in Figure 8(a) are 4 and 1, respectively; after the first scaling as shown in Figure 8(b), the 
number of required FBGs and switches becomes 4 × 4 + 4 (=20) and 4 respectively; after the second 
scaling as shown in Figure 8(c), the number of required FBGs and switches becomes (4 × 4 + 4) × 4 (=84) 
and 4 × 4 + 4 (=20) respectively. Inductively, the number of required FBGs and switches for the 
SSC-based AOFSN are  
 

1
1
4
i s
s
s and  


i s
s
s
1
4 respectively. The formulas in 2) for PSC-based AOFSN can 
be obtained from Figure 9(a) to Figure 9(c) by the same induce as that for SSC-based AOFSN. 
Tables 3 and 4 show the scaling speed and the scaling cost in terms of the required numbers of 
FBGs and switches for SSC and PSC-based SSNs according to the above calculation. Moreover, the 
sensing coverage for different scaling degrees is also shown. In the context of SSC-based SSNs, the 
number of sensor nodes increases from 20 to 84 when scaling from degree 1 to degree 2, while the 
needed number of switches only increases from 4 to 20. When it is scaled to degree 3, the number of 
required switches is increased to 84, which is quite small compared to the number of required 340 
FBG sensors. This is indicating good scalability in view of the large number of FBGs after scaling, and 
less cost in view of the number of switches compared to that the corresponding FBGs. In view of the 
PSC-based SSN, the scaling speed in terms of the number of FBGs is better than that of the SSC-based 
SSN; however, the cost in terms of the number of required switches is much higher than that of the 
SSC-based SSN. 
Table 3. Scalability of SSC. 
Scaling Degree
SSC 
i = 1  i = 2  i = 3 
# of sensors  20 84  340 
# of switches  4 20  84 
Sensing Coverage  10.28
2 r   46.84
2 r   193.08
2 r  
Table 4. Scalability of PSC. 
Scaling Degree
PSC 
i = 1  i = 2  i = 3 
# of sensors  25 75  625 
# of switches  5 30  155 
Sensing Coverage  14.43
2 r   61.33
2 r   311.00
2 r  
1 5
 i
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4 4
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7. Conclusions 
This paper considered analyzing the reliability and scalability of a large-scale hierarchical all optical 
fiber sensor networks based on FBG sensors. The Hierarchical AOFSN consists of three levels to 
guarantee reliability. We focused on the third sensor subnet level due to its passivity. To guarantee 
reliability for the first two higher levels, the switch architecture for RN was proposed. This kind of RN 
architecture is recoverable for the SSN system when link failure happens between RNs and InS or 
between FBGs, or both. The basic segment in the third SSN level is called the sensor cell, including 
square-based SC (SSC) and pentagon-based SC (PSC) in our research. The two kinds of SCs were 
proposed based on their regularity and unicursal characteristic, which is good for simple routing and 
good scalability. The reliability of SSC-based AOFSN was evaluated and analyzed in terms of the 
sensing ability (coverage area) in cases that one or multiple link failures happen. And the sensing 
reliability of the proposed architecture even exceeds 99.999%, satisfying the five 9s’ requirement of 
reliability. The scalability was evaluated in terms of the maintenance of a self-similar topology as well 
as the scaling speed of sensing coverage after the SSC- and PSC-based AOFSNs have been scaled. The 
cost in terms of the required number of FBGs and 2 × 2 switches was also considered as an evaluation 
of the scalability. The calculations show that the rate of increase of the number of required FBGs is 
much higher than that of the corresponding number of required 2 × 2 switches and the sensing 
coverage is also scaling fast. 
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